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The LIABILITY of a MLNER of a DE FACTO CORPORATION.

-------- 0------

Liability on Contracts.

The growth of corporations and of corporation law,
is,

in the main. the product of recent years. Corpora-

tions have become the favorite instruments of persons
uniting themselves for trade or profit.Among the reasons
for this is the fact that the nature of a corporation is
such that it may be made up of so great a number of persons that large enterprises with corresponding chances
of profit may be undertaken without the risk of ruin to
any one of those interested. This is true only because
of the limited liability of corporate members which is
given by statutes. It is this fact which leads persons
to enter or create a corporation rather than a partnership, burdened with its joint and several liability.
The liability of a corporate stockholder is limited to
the amount he has invested in the corporation, or at
the worst, to but a limited amount in addition . A member of a firm, however, is liable to an amount limited

only by the extent of the liabilities of the firm.
This limited liability is the vital difference between a corporation and a partnership;

one, the creat-

ure of statute, the other, of common law. This proposition being quite generally understood, by those who
have money to invest, has the influence we have suggested.
But has every person who holds stock certificates
which prima facie make one a member of a corporation,
secured this great immunity? Has a person secured this
limited liability when he becomes a member of a supposeed corporation ? A layman would probably answer that if
a mam did not become a member of a corporation he would
not have that limited liability which is peculiar to a
member of a corporation. But the

luestion is not so eas-

ily disposed of, for it is answered both affirmatively
and negatively by authority. This thesis is the result
of an impartial investigation of the authorities and it
is believed that the conclusions reached will be verified by a thoughtful examination and weighing of the au-k
thorities collated and cited.
The subject of our investigation is the liability
of a member of a supposed corooration. Has he a liability of the same limited extent as that of a member of ao
member of a corporation de jure?
As we have suggested a de facto corporation

is not

a corporation. A corporation is created only when certain pepple are given a charter by a, sovereign power, or

when, under general laws for incorporation, certain people called incorporators, comply with the provisions of
these laws. A compliance with these provisions

is a con-

dition precedent to the existence of the corporation.
A solution of our problem involves the consideration of the whole subject of de facto corporations, so
we will here state the conditions which are necessary to
its existence and the kinds or divisions thereof. The
first re,-uisite is that there must be a law permiting
the formation of a corporation.(1) The second is that
there must be acts done or contracts made by the supposed agents of the supposed corporation.
There are we believe but two classes of de facto
corporations; one which results from a bona fide but unsuccessful attempt to incorporate;the other which results from a bare-faced usurpation of corporate privleges. It might be thought that another class of de
facto corporations would result where the corporation
has expired and the members and officers continue to do
business in the name of the corporation. In such a situation,however,it is held that the directors of a corporation,at its expiration,take all its property as
trustees for the benefit of the stockholdersthe cestuis
que trust. (2).It was for this reason that the stockholders escape liability,in the case noted,as partners.
Por our purposes,we may say,that a stockholder of a
de facto corporation is liable only in two directions.

First:-To the corporation.
Second:-To third persons who contract with the
supposed a ,'ents of the supposed corporation.
His liability to ti e de facto corporation until the
full value of his subscription is paid may be regarded
as settled and unquestioned.The authorities are unanimous that a stockholder of a de facto corporation is
liable when sued for calls.

(1).This liability is based

on astoppel,and,if I interpret the authorities correctly,
arises because he has allowed himself to be held out to
the public as a stockholder and must live up to his representations so that the capital stock of the corporation,a trust fund for the benefit of creditors,may not
fade away like a phantom.
The extent of his liability to parties who contract
with the supposed corporation through its supposed Offirers or agents is not generally agreed upon.To a consideration of this point we will direct our attention. We
will be aided in our, investigation if we determine the
nature of a de facto corporation.What is a de facto corporation? It is an association of persons who regard
themselves as,or assert that they aremembers of a corporation that does hot exist. What are the various associations recognized or created by statutes or Common
Law? How may social or business enterprises be carried
on other than by an individual? In the United States,
persons who unite themselves to carry out any enterprise

business or social,are members either of a corporation,
a partnership,a joint stock association,or a club.
De facto corporations are not another sort of an
association. The only questions about them are,first,
under which of the above named classes do they fall,and
this beinm-

det.rmined,second,is the liability of a mem-

ber of a defacto corporation modified or varied because
he is a, member of a de facto corlpration? The second
Iuestion will perhaps strike the reader as being confused but it is not. Any

seeming confusion results from

the coupling,as 1 think unfortunately,of the words"de
facto"and "corporation". We will later giver our reasons
for considering the term "de faoto corporation"a misnomer. The thought of the above ouestion can be expressed
more clearly perhaps,though at greater length,as follows:
When it is determined which of the four posstble associations ramed,a corporation de facto is,is then the
liability,which attaches by law to a member of the association discovered,altered because the member thought
himself a member of a corporation and besause some third
party has contracted with the supposed agent of the supposed corporation to which the member in ruestion belonged.
For example suppose it were determined that a de
facto corporation was a partnership. This alone however
would not conclusively determine the liability of a member,for the partnership liability may be varied,first,
by an express contract limiting the liability of a firm
or a member in any way desired,or,second,by the presence

of an estoppel.
We have no;,th refore,but two questions left -for
our consideration.
First:- What Nind of an association is a de
facto corporation?
Second:-

Is the liability of a member of the
discovered association varied either
b,, express contract to that effect or
by an estoppel?

We must keep iii mind that an ans-,er to the first
-uestion does not decide tr

second. It can bo no more

than raise a presumpti2n as shown by our illustration
above. First,then,is a de facto corporation a corporation,a partnership,a joint stock association or a club?
A de facto corporation id not a, corporation. On this
point the authorities do not differ. This sounds paradoxical but even in those jurisdictions that have given
to the members of a de facto corporation the rights and
powers,privileges and immunities of members of a corporation de jure,the desision has been solely upon the
ground of estoppel.

(1).This,in itself,shows that what

is called a corporation de facto is not a corporation,
that it is another sort of an association but that the
person interested cannot show the truth.
It is unfortunate that the books use the terms corporation de facto and corporation de jure. The term corporatioii de facto seems to us to be a mis-nomer,while
to affix "de jure"to the word "corporation"seems unnec-

essary. Prima facie it would ±ndicate that corporations
It
are divided into these two classes. This is not true.
would be as accurate to divide men intl men that are men,
and men that areAmen. $uch a division would doubtless
convey a mea.ning but it would be neither physiologicallY
nor legally correct. Accurately speaking all corporations
are corporations de

-ure. Corporations are artificial

creatures of the law. They can come into existence only
by a strict compliance with those mandatory provisions
of the law which permit their formation. If these then
are not complied with, there is no corporation created.
Obvious as the above is,

it should not be left unstated,

for it prepares the way for all that follows.
Since then a. de facto corporation is not a cotporation, is it a partnership? An overwhelming weight of
authority holds that it is.(1) To decide this point it
is only necessary to recollect what a partnership is and
how it is formed. The best definition of a partnership
is that of Pollock viz:-

" Partnership is the relation

which subsists between persons who have agreed to share
the profits of a business carried on by all or any of
them on behalf of all of them."

It seems to us that a de

facto corporation falls within this definition and so is
a partnership. Whatever else may be in the minds of the
members, they assume a voluntary relation to one another
making a contribution to a common fund with an agreement
to share the profits of an enterprise conducted on be-

10.

half of all of them. No articles of partnership are necessary forL1the existence of the relation.

Nor is it nec-

essary that they should assume this relation with a full
understanding of what such acts involve. As to third parties,at least, one who assumes such an attitude will be
held liable as a partner, if he holds such a relation, n
no matter what his intent or understanding was in assuming it.(1) A case which is cited as authority against our
position has dicta to the effect that persons to become
partners must unite with such an intent. (2) I think that
this is not sound. Whether or not persons are partners
depends upon the relation they have actually assumed. The
term partnership describes a relation existing between
people. If the relation exists the term is applicable.
The cuestion then is as to the relation existing between members of a, de facto corporation? All the essentials of a partnership are present, and, with regard to
third persons who have dealt with them or their agents,
they must be held as such. Whatever they might have thought
it is not the policy of the law to permit persons to escape a liability which they have incured through their
own negligence. Among themselves, however, the rights and
liabilities of one partner may be governed by express
contract or by the fraud of those who induced them to ebter into such a relation.
Since then there is so much of authority, and of reason, independent of authority, for holdind members of a

11.

de facto corporation liable

as partners,

are de facto

corporations never held to be either a joint stock association or a club? The only authority that I have found
giving light on this point is a Pennsylvania case where
the members of a Masonic Lodge who had purchased realty
were not held to a partnership liability but, the rules
determining the liability of a club member were applied
and only those who ratified the transaction were held
responsible.(1)
Independent of authority, the test proposition by
which to determine under which class of associations a
particular de facto corporation should be placed might
be to ask: What sort of a common law association it would
ordinarily be, to accomplish the end for which it was established? For example, if the purpose of the organization is social in one case, regard it as a club, but, if
in another case its object be business, consider it a,
partnership. Whatever the future may bring forth, we bel
lieve that we have clearly indicated that at present the
authorities are practically unamimous in holding directly and indirectly that a de facto corporation is a partnership. This fact, however, as we have said before, does
not determine the liability of a member of a de facto corpation. It does, however, raise a strong presumption.
We have now reached the last cuestion which demands
our consideration. Has the regular partnership liability

12.

been varied? If that liability has been changed by express contract, the extent of the liability of the party
sought to be charged will depend entirely upon the provisions of the contract. This can be disposed of briefly.,
But a partnership liability may be changed by estoppel.
The presumiption then being that a member of a de facto
corporation is liable as a partner, it will in every
case rest upon him to prove that the party against whom
he would raise an estoppel made representations to him
or his agent in consequence of which and relying solely
upon which hebentered into the contract. If he can show
this,'the reason for an estoppel exists and it is present. Special cases such as this, however, are rare and
there is no question as to the result in such a case.
Whether or not an estoppel exists, in each case
rests upon questions of fact. Did a person say or do
those things which are necessary to raise an estoppel?
The ;uestion of

importance then in every case is, are the
p

facts found sufficient to raise an estoppel? Having reached this

;onclusion we must consider what is ordinarily

the situation in the case of a contract made with a de
facto corporation. It is simply this, a person other than
a member enters into a contract with a person who holds
himself out to be the agent of a corporation. If the
transaction is completed, performed by both parties, no
question should arise, for there is no doubt but that a

13.

de facto corporation has power to contract. There is no
doubt but that a de facto corporation has all the rights
and privileges which an unincorporated association has.
As we have shown, a corporation de facto is not a non-enity. It is simply not a corporation. The authorities do
not show a single instance where a contract made with a
de facto corporation was held null and void, as would be
the case if there were but a single party to the transattion. The difficulty arises where the contract, be it
express or implied, remains executory upon the part of
the supposed corporation, and it becomes insolvent. The
members of a de facto corporation are members of a partnership or a club or a joint stock association.(1) This
then determines a creditors rights unless they, by his
own acts, have been impaired. Assuming then that they
have not been relinquished by any express contract to
that effect or by any specific conduct which would of
course raise an estoppel against him, we have only to
consider whether

the ordinary contract made by a de afcto

necessarily involves such conduct upon the part of the
other party as will raise an estoppel against him and
bar the rights which otherwise he would have.
How therefore is a contract ordinarily made by a de
facto corporation? What is the situation? Tithout mul-

14.

tiplying illustrating, the facts in every case must be s
substantially these. The members of a de facto corporation through the officers whom they elect, represent to
the public that they are a regularly organized corporation. Nothing is said by either party as to the liability of the members of the association. To illustrate,
the proper officers of a de facto corporation order goods.
The goods are supplied. The question then is, does such
conduct on the part of a person contracting with a de
facto corporation, raise an estoppel? On this point authorities s-uarely differ but even on this precise point
opinion is by no means evenly ballance&.

If 1,orawitz

holds that the making of a contract with a de facto corporation raises an estoppel, Cook and Spelling are of a
contrary opinion.(1) But it is from an examination of
the cases

,hemselves, with reference to this

narticular

point, that we have come to the conclusion that, where-ever this precise point has been considered and the decision has not been based upon other grounds, the over%
whelming weight of authority holds that there is no estoppel;

that the bare making of a contract with a de

facto corporation does not effect a surrender of those
legal rights which are unmentioned at the time and unprovided for in the contract. (2) That we may however
reach a conclusion of our own,founded uron reason, let
us examine the nature of an estoppel. What conduct is suf-

15.

ficient to raise an estoppel? Pomerou

states that there

are six essentials to an estoppel.(1)
First:-

There must be conduct, acts, language
or silence amounting to a representation or concealment of material facts.

Second:-

These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said
conduct or at least the circumstances
must be such that a knowledge of them
is necessarily imputed to him.

Third:-

Th.- trut4 concerning these facts must
be unknown to the other party claiming
the benefit of the estoppel at the
time it was acted upor

Fourth:-

by him.

The party against whom an estoppel is
claimed must have made the representations with an intention that they be
acted upon.

Fifth:-

The pat

representations or conduct m

must be relied and acted upon by him
claiming the benefit of an estoppel.
Sixth:- The part,,

claiming the estoppel must

in fact act upon the representations
in such a manner

-hat he would surfer

a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what has been

16.

done,by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct
and assert rights inconsistent with it.
With these essentials in mind, let us recall the two
classes of de facto corporations and examine the conduct
of the parties to a contract made by either class and
ascertain if the re Luisites of an estoppel are present
in either case. First, we will take the case of a contract
made by a de facto corporation which has resulted after
a bona fide attempt to incorporate. Let us remember that
there is nothing else present to work an estoppel except the bare making of a cont-act. taking the first and
second essentila together for the sake of brevity, we
see that in the case of an ordinary contract made by a
de facto corporation they are not present. Even supposing that by the finest sort or spinning you could make
it appear that a failure to deny statements made to you
can have the effect in law of making them your own representations made to the person making them to you, the
facts are not known to the person, claimed to be estopped,
at the time of his said conduct nor are the circumstances
such that a knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to
him. Silence never amounts to representations unless one
conceals facts 'vhich it is a duty to disclose. Applying
this to the case in point, we see that one to whom statements are made does not conceal facts which he ought to

17.

to disclose;

for he has no knowledge of them beyond what

he is told. Nor is he put upon injuiry, to ascertain the
truth of the statements made to him, in order to prevent
the raising of an estoppel; for one can not gain a vantage point in the field of legal action by the aid of untruths. One can not take advantage of his own wrongz
Since the conduct of a, person barely contracting with a
de facto corporation does not amount to representation ,
the fourth essential is not present. But notice particularly the fifth requisite which makes it essential that
the conduct of the party estopped be such, that the parties claiming an estoppel, solely relied and acted upon
it. This again, it seems to us, conclusively shows the
non-existence of an estoppel in the case before us. A
member of a de facto corporation is not led to the assuming of a privity of contract with a person dealing with
the supposed corporation simply because a person at his
direct or indirect recuest enters into a contract with
him. The reasons which influence him to act are other caiid
many, as the fact that he believed himself a member of a
regularly organized corporation and the reasons for such
a belief. Even in a case where

Ihe representations of one

would be sufficient to raise an estoppel but the other
acts from a reliance upon other facts, or a dut1

rests

upon him to ascertain the truth of the representations
made to him or he has an oppourtunity to fInd out, there
can be no estoppel.
We will now take up the second class of de facto

18.

corporations, those that arise from a male fide usurpation of corporate powers. All that has just been said of
the first class of de facto corporations

ually as

well to this variety, with the following In addition.
You will remember that theljthird essentiJ

of an estoppel

was that the truth concerning the facts represented
must be unknown to the party/ caaiminp the benefit of an
estoppel at the time when such conduct occured and at
the time it was acted upon. In the case of a bare usurpation, you see the force of the above at once. Clerrly
this is another point, if another were needed, that shows
the imposibility of the existence of an estoppel in the
cast- of an ordinary contract made with a de facto corporation.
While even if it could be sustained with a shadow of
reason that the mere ma1inP- of a contract with a de facto
is conduct which amounts to representations on the part
of the one contracting with it, yet there are,as we have
indicated, a lack of other and necessary elements which
constitute an estoppel. The point which we wish we wish
to have stand out clearly is that the making of a contrac
with a de facto cor-poration does not involve conduct,upan
the part of a person contracting with a de facto corporation, sufficient to raise an estoppel changing the liability of the members of a de facto corporation. Is the
mere making of a contract with a de facto corporation
sufficient to raise any estoppel against the person con-

19.

tracting? It certainly is. By the making of such a contract one recognizes the right of the association to contract as an association but nothing more.

(1).That is,he

cannot afterwards escape performance of the contract by
asserting that since there was no corporation he contracted with a creature of straw and so was in no way
bound. As an unincorporated association has power to
contract,one contracting with a de facto corporation
does not recognize

an,, power which is peculiar to a

corporation. The miaapprehension which exists concerning
a de facto corporation arises,it seems to us,because
while not a corporation,authority unanimously and properly gives to them many powers and rights which are exercised by a corporation de jure. This being so the presumption naturally suggested is that since they have
these privileges they should,with regard to the persons
with whom they contract,have all

the rights ahd immun-

ities,powers and privileges of a corporation de jure.
This misapprehension springs from a mistaken idea as to
the true status of a de facto corpovation. It is an unincorporated association. It is not a non-enity vitalixed for the moment by the operation of an estoppel.The
reason for its having so many of the rights of a corporation is that an

incorporated society has but few pow-

ers and privileges which cannot bv enjoyed by the unincorpuuated society. Conceding then to a de facto corporation almost all the powers of a corporation,if they

°

20.

have also those peculiar to a corporation they must have
been gained by express contract or by estoppel;for there
are but three wrays b, which a limited liability can be
ained namely:-

by statute,by express contract,or by the

operation of an astoppel. We trust,for much more might
be said,that we have indicated at sufficient length that
the making of a contract with a. de facto corporation
does not involve conduct sufficient to raise an estoppel.
It would be of advantage just hereit wotId seem to
usin our consideration of estorpel to consider,by way
of contrast,such conduct in tre making of a contract
with an unincorporated association as would be sufficient to raise an estoppel and change the liability of its
members. One wishing to make a contract with them says:
You need not hesitate to enter into this for in case of
trouble your liability is small and 'imited,you are members of a corporation and as such are of course not liable jointly and severally. Strong as this language is
and while prima facie it would raise an estoppel yrt it
may not. These words are the strongest sort of a representation but the trtth concerning these facts may not
be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of an
estoppel,and he may not have relied solely upon the state
ments made to him,he may have had other reasons which
led him to believe that his liability was limited,et cetera. So it is that should a party contracting with a corporation de facto,actually make representations,that it
is possible and even probable that the second,third and
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fifth essentials enumerated by

Pomeroy are absent.

This being True in a case where representations are
actually made by one contracting with a de facto Corporation, consider how much more unlikely it is that an estoppel is present in the case of an ordinar

contract of

where the association itself

a de facto corporation
seeks the contract,showing

fther that thc, have reason

to believe that their liability is limited or,that knowing the contrary to be true,-they are making fraudulent
claims believing that the-, can gain an advantage through
their own wrong and so secure trat great immunity peculiar to members of a corporation. So much from this
point of view. Having as we believe set forth our investigations,at length to justify our conclusions,we shall
but briefly consider other points from which additional
support may be gained.
Fraud in law vitiates everything. The question then
that we would propose is,are the representations made by
the members of a de facto corporation,that their association is incorporated,fraudulent? That a statement may
be fraudulent, it must be a representation of a material
fact made with a knowledge of its falsehood or in reckless disregard of the truth. In the case of a de facto
corporation arising from a bare usurpation of corporate
powers,the representations are undeniabl, fraudulent. In
the case of a de factf

corporation arising from a bona

fide but unsucessful attempt to incorporate the representations are none the less fraudulent. It

, happen
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in either class of the above associations that a member
actuall

believes that he is a member of a. corporation,

de jure,but beyond doubt,it seems to us,that such representations fall within that class of statements false
because made with a reckless disregard of the truth.Does
not a legal duty rest upon the member of any association
to know of what sort of an association he is a member?
WlhQ should know if he should not? If he does not know
it is the result of his own negligence. Statements made
with no better a foundation tiaiJ this cannot be regarded
as bona fide.

(1).Since then the representations of a

member of a de facto corporation are made,in the eyes of
the law,with mala ftdes,can they have changed their position,can they have secured immunity by a mere recital
of untruths? Can an estoppel,resting upon e uity and
good conscience,be raised upon a tissue of falsehoods?
Another proposition which is fr

uentl, met with in

discussions of de facto sorporations is that only the
sovereign power which creates corporations can unimake
them; that a defect in incorporation can only be objected to by the sovereign power. This statement is not altogether untrue. Given a corporation which has done some
act which makes it liable to forfeit its charter,this
statement is pertinent but it applies only to a corporation,de jure. When it is necessary for the creation of
a corporation that provisions of the law be complied
with that are conditions precedent to incorporation and
these provisions have not been complied with,as is the
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case of a, corporation de afcto, tbis rule is inapplicable. Briefly the situation is this. Only the Statf

may

take advantage of a failure to comply with a, condition
subse went to

incorporation because a contract has been

made between the State and the incorporators. But a failure to comply with those provisions of the law which are
necessary to incorporation does not alter the legal position of those at fault. Through their fault the State
has not been brought into the transaction, it is not a
party to it, it has not created an artificial person who
shall stand between the supposed incorporators, members
of the association and the persons with whom they deal.
Neither party is prevented or protected,°from fighting
his own battles and having the same rights and powers as
he would have had, if a corporation had not seemed to
exist because, as it were, of an optical delusion.
We shall close with a consideration offibut one other
point. it is elementary

in the law of contracts that there

can be no contract unless the minds of the parties gave
met. We find it said in discusions of de facto corporations that to permit one who has contracted with a de
facto corporation, to hold the members as partners, on
learning that the conditions precedent to incorporation
have not been complied with, would be to permit the repudiation of a contract and the enforcement of a new one
which was never made. Whether or not this is true depends
upon the question, is it, necessary to the validity of a
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contract that the minds of the parties should meet upon
the extent of the liability of either? Is it necessary
in the making of a contract that this liability be understood or agreed upon? We think not. The extent of ones
liability is a

1uestion

of law, a rule of law. A liabil-

ity imposed by law may be varied but the presumption is
against it. If then in the making of a contract the liability is riot varied,tha law of course determines it. The
fact that one of the parties thought one way and the other,
another, is of no legal importance. one may have contracted with a mistaken idea as to what the law was but ignorance of the law excuses no One. For these reasons we object to the above statement and insist that an attempt
to enforce a liability imposed by law upon a, party to a
contract is not the recision of one contract and the enforcement of a new one never made; it is merely the taking advantage of those remedies provided by law for a
party who has fulfilled his part of the contract,. We
find illustrations that support our view in the case of
contracts made by the agent of an undisclosed principal
and in contracts made by a firm in which there are dormant
partners. A party contracts with one or the other, with
no knowledge of a security beyond the personal liability
of the agent or of those who represent themselves as composing the firm. If it becomes necessary for him to enforce the contract through law, and he endeavors to collect from the undisclosed principal or the dormant parta
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ners, he is not repudiating an old contract and enfocing a new.
Liability may rest upon questions of fact but the
facts being determined, the !iability is a

,questionof

law, The liability of parties to a contract, being a matter of law, is conclusively presumed to be in the minds
of the parties and is, as it were, written into the contract.

-- 0---

Liability for Torts.

In this class of cases, the question of estoppel can
not arise. Therefore no privilege of corporate membership can be even claimed for a mamber of a de facto corporation.
Few cases of this sort are to be found in the reports.

In Louisiana,where a case arose, the members of a

de facto corporation were held indivigually liable as
joint tort feasors.(1)
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CONCLUSTOl :S.

Ii.

A de facto corporation is

an unincorporated as-

sociation.
II.

A contract between a de facto corporation and
third parties does not involve conduct sufficient
to raise an estoppel, changing the liabilitj of
members.

III.

One may sue the members of a de facto corporation as partners.

IV.

(emble)

That the representations of a member

of a, member of a de facto corporation, to the effect
that their association is incorporated, are fraudulent.
V.

The holding of members to their common law liability is not the repudiation of an old con tract
and the enforcement of a new one.

